This is just a little something I made up for my Modern Fantasy Setting. I need something substantial for it being that I lack a sufficient knowledge on the areas of thought this specific idea draws upon. I'm hoping there are a few people out there who are knowledgeable concerning these thing's including conventional military doctrine and military technologies naming system; i.e. how does the US Military name it's tanks from M1 to M23? Do they stand for something? Are there specific divisions from which these are drawn from? So on and so forth...
The Variable Threat Unit
Overview:
It was an exercise in failure.
It was first proposed by three US military personnel of the mid-level administrative agencies. The proposal was actually drafted after two Companies lobbied for the idea with the support of two senators and several congressmen. The President himself at that time was intrigued by the idea.
The idea went into research and development for about twenty years. Such a length of time taken to achieve a prototype phase should've have already foreshadowed its result, but the project persisted. About thirty billion US Dollars have already been spent into the project for the first ten years. Incredible marketing from the two private contractors and a looming war with former allies was agitating public sentiment and opinion. By the time it was actually ready for field deployment, the original enemy intended for it had already withdrawn from open conflict. Thus, it was merely pointless and the project was made General Issue for five years, until a new conflict arose.
This was against the Vietcong. The Communist Faction of Vietnam predictably moved into armed rebellion after three years of seething existence. US forces deployed at waiting in Key Cities were quick to respond to an orchestrated attack of simultaneous strikes on several strategic locations. Armories, Camps, and Industrial Centers were targeted and barely defended. The Capital was the first proper victory of Defending Vietnamese Anti-Communist Troops and US Infantry Divisions.
It was perceived to be an ideal testing ground for the five years idle Variable Threat project. Minimal forces were transported and deployed at first. The General thought of it as a clean sweep being that the unit was designed exactly for these kinds of situations, unconventional battlegrounds. Unfortunately, they were not exact enough. The projects perceived plan of increasing US Forces versatility significantly impinged on other military roles like mechanized infantry, cavalry, armor, and such. The project rolled all these functions into one. In effect, all the strengths and all the weaknesses of every role were crammed into one unit.
This ended in the US losing its first war on foreign soil. The Variable Threat unit was scrapped and recalled. The veterans of said units still suffer from the aftermath effects of said war, while the Infantry Divisions moved in with minimal success on their operations. Vietnam has since then been a fully communist state with US forces and Democratic sympathizers expelled and exiled from the country.
The mistakes of the VTU field use were used in the proceeding Korean and Oceana conflicts. However, it was at this time that US Congress and Military Personnel had lost all confidence in the Project. This was not the end of it though.
Theoretical Framework:
The basic premise behind the VTU is the perceived need for a class of fighting individuals capable of meeting any or all combat roles needed in any given theatre of conflict. The official term given for this project was ALL PURPOSE THEORY.
The requirements it had included encompassed all fields, all classes of training, and all kinds of equipment; all of which were crammed into one military doctrine. In effect, the resources needed to research its possibilities were expensive and tedious as it reached into so many diverse fields of thought and application.
However, it was actually producing the unit which proved the most significant in cost to both manpower and material resource.
Men and Women were subjected to training which lasted about ten years. This particular program was dubbed the Spartan Program inspired by the militaristic society of classical age Sparta. This training included a general introduction into all fields of thought and application deemed relevant to war in general. This succeeded in producing not only capable soldiers, but also capable tacticians, thinking men and women who knew everything that was needed to be known concerning their objectives, scope and limitations, the equipment they were allowed to deploy, the tactics they were to employ, and the psychology behind the people that fought wars. Thus, each and every soldier was in effect also a middle-ranking officer of strategic value not only to the field but also to direct command.
This capability was coupled with equipment suitable for all theatres of war. The amount of resources pooled into this thought was also expensive, but it achieved the objective. The equipment fielded to the soldiers of this unit was singular in nature but also all purpose of scope. The pinnacle of this doctrine was The Aegis system.
Equipment:
The Aegis System was the only equipment deployed by the US Army as VTU Specific.
The system itself was a kit that included three things, weapons, engineering, and armored vehicles.
The system relied heavily on tactical deployment rather than inherent specializations commonly seen in conventional war machines. This system included a half-tracked vehicle APC fit for five fighting men and all the personnel devices they could possibly need. This APC was fit for any terrain deployment, especially densely covered areas with infinite angles of ambush. All this was remedied by intensive research into vehicular sensors, situational awareness devices; mini jacketed armories, short to medium range fuel and engine capacities, forty-eight hours worth of ammunition and consumables, and emergency exit hatches. The armor itself is covered with reactive plates and the entire form is angled and lowered to ensure maximum capacity for anywhere anytime deployment.
This system is expensive and staggeringly heavy at sixty-one tons. It has the resilience of a tank without the firepower, but with the added benefit of a compact Mobile HQ meant for small to medium scale warfare, deployable in squads per Aegis.
The Operational Name for The Aegis is VTU M24.
Operational Protocol:
The M in M1 and such probably just stands for Military.
From what I gather the purpose of the VTU was to be able to replace any type of unit if needed? Or simulate the abilities of any unit at any time? If that's true here's what I think about it so far.
Seems that it accomplishes what it needs to do, I did see a few things that could be problems. The Aegis doesn't have the firepower of a tank, so it doesn't look like it can replace/simulate any high firepower units.
Another thing that jumped out to me was you said the training was 10 years long, extremely expensive. Why would the military use these people on the frontline? It isn't cost effective, training someone for 10 years to just put them in the most dangerous area possible, even if an accident happens that's a huge loss.
On a historical note reactive armor wasn't invented until 1982 I believe, by Germany for Israel.
The name is for engineering purposes. There is a M2, M3, ect. but these were failed models that were never used. If they go through five different designs before they get one that works then the one that works is M5. Even though they were scrapped they still hold a title.
Actually, the M2 and M3 are various model groups (M2A2, M2A3, etc. . .) of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle - designed to deploy in support of the M1 MBT. As for actual numbers, I've yet to see any clear system; the Sherman Tank of WW II was the M4. . .
Sorry to tell you this, but the Aegis you've described is a death trap. To back up - the M1 tank is a death trap (any tank is really) which is why it is supported by the M2/M3 BTV. The Bradley is also a death trap, which requires the support of the M1 tank. They were developed together to deploy together effectively - each supporting the others vulnerabilities. But, an APC in dense terrain with multiple angles of ambush is exactly what I'm talking about there. The reason for combined arms doctrine is because universal units don't work - either as soldiers or as vehicles.
All that said, don't let it stop you from telling a good story. I love Classic BattleTech and you really can't get more absurdly unrealistic.
Quote from: Snargash MoonclawSorry to tell you this, but the Aegis you've described is a death trap. To back up - the M1 tank is a death trap (any tank is really) which is why it is supported by the M2/M3 BTV. The Bradley is also a death trap, which requires the support of the M1 tank. They were developed together to deploy together effectively - each supporting the others vulnerabilities. But, an APC in dense terrain with multiple angles of ambush is exactly what I'm talking about there. The reason for combined arms doctrine is because universal units don't work - either as soldiers or as vehicles.
Yup, this is why tanks (at least ones driven by sane people) never enter an ambush prone area (such as a city or a thick forest) without troop support. Tanks have horrible vision and are very vulnerable to having someone waltz right up and plant an explosive on their side or lobbing an RPG (that's rocket propelled grenade, not role playing game :P ) into their weakly armored topside from a nearby rooftop. Out in the open its a different story but even then tanks risk things like mines and hidden emplacements. This all is part of the reason that when not in actual combat most tank commanders prefer to drive with someones head out the top hatch.
While I didn't specifically outline it, APC (like the Bradley) are present primarily to prevent just such attacks. (Cold War Soviet doctrine incorporated mechanized infantry in BMPs and BTRs, etc. in the same fashion, deploying rifle squads on foot out the back as needed, otherwise firing from ports inside the vehicle.) The tanks target and eliminate the heavy, longer range weapons which would utterly destroy an APC with one decent shot, while the APCs eliminate the close range infantry threats to the tanks. After WW II tanks became far too vulnerable to be used in the same fashion - too many cheap, light, infantry deployable weapon systems capable of stopping if not destroying them were proliferating throughout the world. The effectiveness of earlier, very light munitions like LAWs and RPGs vs tanks has become non-existent, especially with armor skirts protecting the treads having become standard but they still have some effect on lighter vehicles and TOWs and similar weapons remain effective against heavier armored vehicles. Like swords and armor in the middle ages the two leapfrog.
In a similar fashion, a universal type soldier would constitute a supporting unit - meant to integrate effectively with any principal line units regardless of the latter's function rather than constituting lead elements themselves. A certain amount of initial deployment would like be included in their mission parameters, but this would be similar to Light Infantry doctrine back in the 80s -90s. They would be advance units with minimal equipment, establishing an operational zone quickly to be supported soon after by slower, heavier units. The problem with this sort of flexibility on the modern battlefield is that such units could not perform any mission particularly well themselves.
Quote from: Snargash MoonclawWhile I didn't specifically outline it, APC (like the Bradley) are present primarily to prevent just such attacks. (Cold War Soviet doctrine incorporated mechanized infantry in BMPs and BTRs, etc. in the same fashion, deploying rifle squads on foot out the back as needed, otherwise firing from ports inside the vehicle.) The tanks target and eliminate the heavy, longer range weapons which would utterly destroy an APC with one decent shot, while the APCs eliminate the close range infantry threats to the tanks. After WW II tanks became far too vulnerable to be used in the same fashion - too many cheap, light, infantry deployable weapon systems capable of stopping if not destroying them were proliferating throughout the world. The effectiveness of earlier, very light munitions like LAWs and RPGs vs tanks has become non-existent, especially with armor skirts protecting the treads having become standard but they still have some effect on lighter vehicles and TOWs and similar weapons remain effective against heavier armored vehicles. Like swords and armor in the middle ages the two leapfrog.
In a similar fashion, a universal type soldier would constitute a supporting unit - meant to integrate effectively with any principal line units regardless of the latter's function rather than constituting lead elements themselves. A certain amount of initial deployment would like be included in their mission parameters, but this would be similar to Light Infantry doctrine back in the 80s -90s. They would be advance units with minimal equipment, establishing an operational zone quickly to be supported soon after by slower, heavier units. The problem with this sort of flexibility on the modern battlefield is that such units could not perform any mission particularly well themselves.
This sort of reminds me of the seabees (though of course they were focused more on engineer work than fighting but they did both). You know, looking at this I might recommend you do some research on the seabees. They seem to fit very well what you are trying to do here.
Ah, truth is, I was merely going for plausibility here and not actual success. Do not that the first statement presented by this article was, "This was an exercise in failure."
This article was supposed to outline why a certain project failed in the alternate history of the year 1991.
I poked around here for failures in logic and suspension of belief and actual military research. Seabees eh? Hmmm. I'll read up on that. Anything else?
True - I plan to actually get back to you here with some more constructive suggestions - I noted in particular that you identified this immediately as modern *fantasy* - hence there's considerably more freeplay in seeking verisimilitude than when going for historical realism.
Setting present time is '91 (just after GW I our present)? Can you give a brief outline of the conflicts and operations engaged in w/there years? (Sounded like Korea was after Vietnam in the setting.) What was Oceania about? Consider other hotspot ops as well where they (or other special units) might have been deployed. What alternate technological advances are you proposing during this timeline?
Actually, the setting I have for the campaign would be at the year 2100 and beyond. I set this at 91 just so I could give out a believable timeline for its development and possible deployment in a major US and foreign nation state conflict. So far, this and Oceania were actually on the spot ideas because my real preliminary timeline was as follows. This is still subject to change though as I try and streamline everything into one coordinated package.
Canon: Conceptual-Speculative Fiction
This is in no way an aptly educated article on speculative history done with deviations on individuals that modified certain events that marked history and thus changed its course from the direction our reality has chosen to take. This is merely an easy to comprehend list of events that happened in that history given that certain people were in existence while other are not. However, it should be kept in mind both for player and reader that the information contained herein is only enough to mark a general path of events which do not include specific and most often faction-secured information. If an analogy is required, consider this the basic context of a regular Secondary Education Level Textbook. The timeframe herein will start at the most obvious of historical deviations from ours, namely; the rise of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi Regime, with their proceeding replacement by The Dominion faction-entity.
World History in Canon Reality
1940; Hitler Rose to Power
1943; Hitler Falls
1944; The Dominion Completely Replaced The Nazi Power Structure
1945; The Dominion Successfully Occupies All Nation-States Adjacent To Germany
1946; Treaty of Rome
1947; Oppenheimer Diaspora
1950; The Manhattan Project
1952; Violation of The Treaty of Rome
1953; The Dominion of Evil
1957; The Corporation of Evil
1959; The Race Question
1960; The Arms Boom
1962; The Missile Project
1965; Subjugation of The Sands
1970; Second Treaty of Paris
1971; Hydrogen Pact of Tokyo
1972; Clean Energy Boom
1975; Anglo-American Conflict
1976; Violation of The Second Treaty of Paris
1977; The Dominion Occupies Switzerland
1980; Sino-Russian Conflict
1983; Neutral Territory Pact
1984; Ideological Freedom Pact
1987; The War Council
1989; The Dominion-French Conflict
1990; Third Treaty of Paris
1995; Sino-Japanese Conflict
2000; The Third World Question
2010; Sino-Indian Conflict
2011; Second War Council
2015; The Tokyo Pact
2016; The Dominion-USA Conflict
2017; The Dominion-USSR Conflict
2018; Second Sino-Russian Conflict.
2020; Anglo-American Council
2025; League of Free Men
2030; The Death of Paris
2040; The Bastion of Rome
2041; Third War Council
2050; The Hate Conflict
2051; The Death of Pyongyang
2052; The Emergency of Seoul
2053; Treaty of Kuala Lumpur
2054; The Dominion-PRC Conflict
2056; The Agreement of London
2060; The Decimation of Malaysia
2061; The Horror of Cambodia
2062; The Death of Zimbabwe
2070; The Clearing of Sands
2075; The Agreement of The United Arab States
2071; The Treaty of Jerusalem
2072; The Decimation of Bethlehem
2073; Violation of The Treaty of Jerusalem
2080; Death of Iran
2081; Death of Iraq
2082; Second Treaty of Jerusalem
2084; The West Bank Conflict
2085; Violation of The Second Treaty of Jerusalem
2086; Occupation of Saudi Arabia
2089; The Great Satan Looms
2090; The Arms Race
2095; Fourth War Council
2100; Tomorrow is Here.
I think the titles placed here would be pretty self explanatory, but I'm still doing some reading on the possible ways I could elaborate this timeline into something more substantial yet at the same time not anal retentive enough to stifle creativity. I'm thinking, basic textbook material and leave out specific papers done by notable individuals as case to case basis studies.
Also, my idea for VTU was actually just a way to present the predecessor for a more effective unit that would soon replace the normal Military Structure of the USA of today. This replacement would take place about 60 to 80 years from this VTU's conception and it's successor is called the Modular Threat Unit.
[casting=Minor Wall of Text] Okay - I see lots of room to play here. Some of the events aren't entirely self-explanatory as they depend upon previous variables - but specific questions can be presented as needed.
First off tho', you've mentioned communism and I see mention of the USSR so I take it the Bolshevik Revolution successfully preceded this timeline. Lots of Sino-x conflicts - what's China's political stance? I bring these up specifically because US Cold War doctrine revolved around these factors. (As a Cold War veteran I can address your original question about conventional doctrine within this time frame. I have not kept up on post-GWI changes - there have been many and they're far from done.) Until the fall of the USSR, the US military did *absolutely nothing* (or even thought about it) without framing it in the context of the Big Burning Question: What if Russia invades Europe while we're busy doing x? West Coast based divisions, while slated for Central/South American and East Asian conflicts (such as renewed Korean hostilities) were placed in that stance very specifically as current standing units which could be spared from planning for The Big One. (The fact that Soviet-Chinese relationships went to hell was a huge boon in Pentagon thinking.) That is, manning/recruiting goals where determined as "how many divisions, fleets, etc. of what types do we need on hand as a deterrent to Soviet aggression and how many more of the same do we need to have available to deploy in the rest of the world?" Tech R&D and doctrinal changes it produced always addressed this first. (Of course if we kept pace with/ahead of Soviet developments we were inherently far ahead of anyone else technologically speaking.) The question which follow those beginning this paragraph is "What is the Dominion?" Where, how big, how wealthy and how advanced? Clearly it introduces a major variable into the doctrinal equation I've just described at a very early point in (actually preceding) the development of that doctrine in the early 50's. Subsequent factors involving the Middle East, African conflicts by proxy (fought by US vs Soviet/Cuban troops) and SE Asian conflicts (along with the African, these were critical to further development and testing of Soviet Chem/Bio weapons, and from that I am convinced, ultimately to our involvement in both Gulf Wars) were all developments of, and utterly dependent upon, US/USSR military postures (and posturing). I can't stress this enough - when I was stationed in Germany in the mid/late '80s, all active terrorist threats in Europe were depicted as radical communist party splinter groups backed by East German and Soviet agents and funding - this specifically included the Green Party! The Pentagon saw Soviet/WP presence and activities in absolutely everything they deemed in any way even a potential threat to National and/or Allied (NATO) security or which in any way expressed any disagreement with US foreign policies and relations. While the Dominion creates a different balance of power scenario the preceding model is still most likely to apply - just along different vectors.
Finally, for now, what does the US military look like now (2100)? For your purposes, the best thing to do is clearly lay this out - technology, training, funding and equipment in general (clothing and personal equipment matters), etc. Have any DNI technologies or other cyber enhancements (physical or mental) been developed? Nano? Stealth/detection/counter measures? Describe a good, fairly complete picture of these and then simply lay out a critical path from WWII to 2100 as would be driven by Cold War doctrine and planning as applied to your alternate set of world powers. [/casting]
Aight, for this, I need a lot of research, and I mean research on specific articles concerning the cold war. Would Time Magazine be good? I already have my own resource pool concerning the Nazis and a good book on the Other Europe, I jut need time on that.
Also, why Cold War doctrine? I do think that it would help at determining US military thinking from 1960 to 2020 within my campaign's timeline, but considering The Dominion I don't think a Cold War would be a safe thing to do, even if it is an aggravation suppression act between USSR and the USA. Also, I'm placing Putin in charge of the entire USSR power structure at the same time as he held power in real life. I have a feeling my world would be a lot more fun with him around, well, at least with my thinking of who he is and not actually who he is. I could produce an allegory or a metaphor for him, but I'm am generally into him cause he's so bad ass.
The reason why I doubt Cold War doctrine would be useful once The Dominion slowly takes active roles is because of this, another piece of my campaign:
The Badlands
The Badlands is a term you use for any place in the world that has been so ravaged by war no one wants to live there. Of course, no one usually includes a huge plethora of people too; you just don't know who they are.
The basic idea behind this is called scorched earth and so far there has only been one entity that produces the most scorched earth in apathetic fashion: The Dominion. These deeply scarred places are spread all over the world where The Dominion has chosen to touch in ways not even the word corrupt could describe. This is mostly to the fact that The Dominion does not pollute or change anything. The Dominion merely takes, keeps, and owns. Included into their strategy is the doctrine that it is better to destroy everything that will not comply than it is to try and pacify individuals. Such a doctrine resulted in the death of several cities that have in the past opposed The Dominion in open conflict.
All these areas which were 'Processed for Dominion Utility' seemed to share one common trait: an efficient resource spot. These spots range from not only materials but also energy; solar spots, wind spots, thermal spots, wave movements, to reservoirs of oil and clumps of minerals.
In totality, there are over seven Badlands class areas on Earth by the year 2070. Each and every area was a direct result of conflict struck against The Dominion and its interests. Needless to say, after the seventh death of a land, all forms of open conflict have been rethought in both doctrine and application. Now, all theatres of war are kept in mutual agreement to be waged within parameters far from populated points in any given territory. Terrorism and insurgency has been deemed too costly an activity, especially against an occupying force like The Dominion being that The Dominion merely chose to slaughter all traces of resistance and replace the space with Dominion infrastructure and personnel. For a proper war; a plethora of laws were enacted by the International Community to ensure humanity's development despite conflicts within governing bodies. These conflicts were more like games rather than actual battle fields as the destruction of life was deemed more taboo than ever before. Only The Dominion, until now, is feared for taking up arms in unpredictable and constantly ruthless and brutal ways. The Only reason why The Dominion has kept dormant and slow in expansion is because of the Paris Agreement which outlined the laws and measures that kept conflict in line, disallowing any deviations as crimes against the International Community thus meriting an attack from a united International Community. The Dominion maybe powerful, but the ability to face the world in arms alone had yet to reach its grasp. For now, piece by piece, was as much as the entity could do in achieving its unknown goals.
And these pieces were known as the Badlands. Everyone knew that despite the purging that The Dominion did on things it did not want this was all done because there was a desire which The Dominion acted upon. This desire was highly dependent upon the locations The Dominion chose to occupy. After the first three deaths, it was always found that The Dominion would one way or another acquires another advantage for its purposes. Because of this, the other Factions have begun to wage their wars to retake what is now a wide expanse of what seems to be nothingness. The clarity behind Dominion actions has always been devoid of reason, but once the action has been done, it always resulted in a sudden revelation that sent its enemies into seething fits.
And so they learned from their mistakes and adapted accordingly. Whatever it was that The Dominion was after, everyone else would also pursue for the sheer purpose of not only understanding what The Dominion wants, but also to keep them from achieving anything. In the end, the Paris Agreement had this factor into as the basis for its structure.
Conflicts were only allowed within the Seven Badlands. Everywhere else was considered a crime against the Agreement and would be subject to retaliation from every signatory entity of power. Unfortunately, The Dominion was one of them.
Badlands 1, Middle East
Badlands 2, Europe
Badlands 3, South East Asia, The Philippine Islands, Visayas Islands, Panay Island
Badlands 4, North America
Badlands 5, Arctic
Badlands 6, China-Russia
Badlands 7, Antarctica
Each and every one of those points is now under constant conflict. The laws are vital, true, but within those boundaries where there is no one to police the combatants, there is nothing but entropy. But'¦but maybe there is something, only a few are sure it's even there, and everyone wants it.
Now I understand that the words above may not be strictly adhering to the timeline I tried to make up, but please keep in mind that I'm still within the preliminary stages with this.
Also, for a look at the kind of tech I'll be employing, please take a look at the following links being that I used these as thinking grounds on what I think I'll do concerning tech.
http://www.locution-zine.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=379
http://forums.megatokyo.com/index.php?showtopic=1731910&st=0
[casting=Superior Wall of Text] The reason I refer to Cold War doctrine, outside of the fact that it continues to shape current doctrine, if only as a reference point to determine what needs to change, is that much of it would still apply to the world you seem to be describing. The nature and scope of armed conflicts have changed radically from "The Big One" which fortunately never happened, so current and future doctrinal developments are best understood in comparison to that, i.e., previous doctrine reflected previous conditions while current changes are intended to reflect current conditions. For the purpose of your timeline, the key thing to be aware of is why that doctrine arose in the 50s (how America was thinking about the world and its role in it) and what the doctrine's implementation was intended to accomplish (in the context of that thought).
America emerged from WWII with the realization that it had become a, if not the, leading global power. This was a radical shift in national self-perception, which even after WWI had remained that of one in a number of major powers - one which generally did not want to get involved in the affairs of those others unless absolutely necessary. This new self image then raised the "moral" question of whether or not the new posture carried a responsibility toward the rest of the world - a responsibility which America would be abdicating by returning to its former isolationism. This was coupled with the recognition that the USSR, through its absorption of European satellite nations (forming the Warsaw Pact) was quickly becoming the only single nation which could claim an equivalent posture. Additionally, due to diametric opposition in the socio-economic theories which the two espoused, both viewed the other as opponents in a broader conflict from which only one could eventually emerge victorious. Just as America claimed a responsibility to "keep the world safe for democracy" the USSR declared a responsibility to keep the world safe for the proletariat.
The rapid development of Soviet nuclear capabilities quickly led to the "deterrent of mutually assured destruction" and further military doctrine, in acknowledgment of this, focused on maintaining the balance of power; a balance from the gaze of both never wavered for even a single second over the course of the next 30 years or so. The capitalist and communist threats, locked in stalemate, remained squared-off in a constant state of paranoid hyper-readiness to react swiftly and decisively to any move on the part of the other should that other ever perceive themselves as having gained sufficient, even if only temporary, advantage and choose to act upon it.
For the purposes of your proposed timeline then, unless there is something hugely different about American involvement in, and the conclusion of, WWII, then your starting point from an American self-perspective is as I initially described above. What you're changing here is the number and nature of opposing world "super-powers." In this case the US and USSR may well have chosen an uneasy truce in the face of a mutual threat in the Dominion, but through the Paris Agreement both still wound up locked in detente! In this sense then, military doctrine of the time would be focused upon achieving essentially the same goals with the same equipment/technology - the balance equation simply includes an additional statement. Or, since I note that the Dominion absorbed the nations which would have constituted the Warsaw Pact, they end up replacing the USSR in the equation which would essentially put the US in the role of anchor-man in a global tug-of-war between the Dominion and Everyone Else, while still having to deal with smaller internecine conflicts between various factions within the non-Dominion bloc. Some they would clearly become embroiled in themselves, others they would simply have take into account for so long as they shook the tenuous unity of the "free world".
Most of the above is regarding the political/strategic doctrine (goals) which determined how we set up our side of the chessboard and why we set it up the way we did. The technology and equipment available and subsequently developed and fielded was one the two principal factors governing the strategic and tactical "combined-arms doctrine" which would dictate how we would go about playing the chess game upon "the integrated battlefield" against an opponent utilizing similar equipment and technology. The second principal factor in this was how the opposing player set up their side of the board coupled with what we knew about how they would go about playing the chess game once it began. Specific examples however, such as the much earlier discussion of inter-supportive deployment of mixed armor and mechanized infantry, were really influenced far less by scouting the opposing team's doctrine and stealing their play-books - the inherent vulnerabilities of the two vehicle types were determined by the technology regardless of any military theory - hence, until you radically change the equipment used to fight, that doctrine of combined-arms upon the integrated battlefield will continue to rule the fundamental strategy and tactics of all sides, including the Dominion, when actually engaging directly in armed conflict on a large scale.
On a smaller scale however, VTU and similar projects could have a role - possibly an even more significant one due to the many apparent lesser conflicts of the timeline - in addressing the fundamental flaw of Cold War tunnel vision demonstrated repeatedly by both sides in such conflicts as Vietnam and Afghanistan. Both powers spent so much energy on planning for The Big One that neither was actually capable of conducting successful little ones. Even if a resounding failure, VTU would indicate an awareness at a much earlier stage of concerns which the US military is only now struggling to identify and address. I think the emphasis however would be more on flexible personal weapon systems rather than vehicles - heightening mobility and dispersion. Your Badlands could well become the stages of some very elaborate cat-and-mouse games. Take a good look at Light Infantry Divisions of the 80's and 90s (my first duty station was in the 7th IDL at Ft. Ord). The ten years of training is far too long I'm afraid - such units would be better recruited from combat veterans put through one to two years of intensive training. One of the reasons (and their are many,) is they would want the bulk of the personnel "in their prime" while actively serving in the unit, not beginning that service at a minimum age of 27. Ranger training would offer a decent starting point, spread that out through the course and expanded with more technical, tactical and leadership training. The vast bulk of personnel will still be enlisted - a little heavy around the middle maybe (NCOs) - the reasons why there is no such thing as a combat unit consisting entirely of commissioned officers, even lieutenants, are far too numerous to go into. Note - generally speaking, a Lieutenant serving as a platoon leader is more expendable than his platoon sergeant. Bachelors degree notwithstanding, he still doesn't know crap - the platoon sergeant knows how to keep his unit (including his LT) alive because he's spent a number of years doing just that while the Butterbar was sitting in a classroom and going to frat parties. (As movies go, "Heartbreak Ridge" illustrates this pretty well.) Junior Company Grades (LT2 and 1) are a make-or-break phase: good officers pay attention and learn quickly, the rest find the military unwilling to renew their commissions.[/casting]
Whoah. This is just...
Complicated. Measured in the fact that I plan on having the US and UK have engage in conflicts while USSR and China engage in on their own too.
Aw man. Hmmm. Any resources you could suggest would be good. I plan on reading back issues of TIME and NEWSWEEK and if I could some articles from the opposing perspective.
also,
Quoteput the US in the role of anchor-man in a global tug-of-war between the Dominion and Everyone Else, while still having to deal with smaller internecine conflicts between various factions within the non-Dominion bloc. Some they would clearly become embroiled in themselves, others they would simply have take into account for so long as they shook the tenuous unity of the "free world".
Cold War tunnel vision demonstrated repeatedly by both sides in such conflicts as Vietnam and Afghanistan.[/quote]On a smaller scale however, VTU and similar projects could have a role - possibly an even more significant one due to the many apparent lesser conflicts of the timeline - in addressing the fundamental flaw of Cold War tunnel vision demonstrated repeatedly by both sides in such conflicts as Vietnam and Afghanistan. Both powers spent so much energy on planning for The Big One that neither was actually capable of conducting successful little ones. Even if a resounding failure, VTU would indicate an awareness at a much earlier stage of concerns which the US military is only now struggling to identify and address. I think the emphasis however would be more on flexible personal weapon systems rather than vehicles - heightening mobility and dispersion.[/quote]The ten years of training is far too long I'm afraid - such units would be better recruited from combat veterans put through one to two years of intensive training. One of the reasons (and their are many,) is they would want the bulk of the personnel "in their prime" while actively serving in the unit, not beginning that service at a minimum age of 27. Ranger training would offer a decent starting point, spread that out through the course and expanded with more technical, tactical and leadership training. The vast bulk of personnel will still be enlisted - a little heavy around the middle maybe (NCOs) - the reasons why there is no such thing as a combat unit consisting entirely of commissioned officers, even lieutenants, are far too numerous to go into. Note - generally speaking, a Lieutenant serving as a platoon leader is more expendable than his platoon sergeant. Bachelors degree notwithstanding, he still doesn't know crap - the platoon sergeant knows how to keep his unit (including his LT) alive because he's spent a number of years doing just that while the Butterbar was sitting in a classroom and going to frat parties. (As movies go, "Heartbreak Ridge" illustrates this pretty well.) Junior Company Grades (LT2 and 1) are a make-or-break phase: good officers pay attention and learn quickly, the rest find the military unwilling to renew their commissions[/quote]
Ah, but that's the thing. The enlistment wouldn't be at 27 or other. I was hoping to drop the experimental stages of training from the usual 18 to 15 and this training will include not only theoretical education but also case studies on the field experience accumulation. I patterned this off the SPARTAN Project of Halo fame.
I understand that this would incur various questions of morality and ethics concerning the youth of all those exposed to military training, but having The Dominion as a variable might be able to produce some support for militaristic attitudes among all those who have been touched by The Dominion.
By anchorman I believe snargash means the primary power. During the cold war the US was the anchor for NATO while Russia played anchor for the Warsaw Pact. Each one was the backing force that gave the whole alliance the legitimacy and power to stand up to their opponents on a global scale.
As for the training thing I also have to point out that it is a bit flawed. Ten years is way too long to be viable for a training regiment. Even modern elite teams don't train near that much (all around front line support teams like the seabees meanwhile get something like 3 months training I believe). The lethality of modern technology has reached a point where it would be extremely wasteful to train someone for ten years before sending them into a situation well known for its high casualty and injury rates. And an age of 15 starting still puts you at a finished age of 25 which is still a fair bit past the prime.
I'm you're unlikely to find anything of substance on the topic in magazine articles, and what you would find will really only offer a glimpse of foreign policy at a specific point in time, so the search through 30-40 years of archives is likely to be a huge amount of work for a minuscule payoff. I used to have a copy of this book (http://www.amazon.com/Nuclear-War-File-Christopher-Chant/dp/085223385X/ref=ed_oe_h). While focusing primarily on the technology of Strategic Nuclear War, as I recall it also provided a lot of info regarding Tactical Nuclear War and the "integrated battlefield." This last term was commonly used in two ways; 1) in reference to a combined overall doctrine incorporating the different branches of the military - Army, Navy and Air Force ceased to have separate doctrines since primary command in a given field of operation would be coordinating assets of all 3 - e.g., stealth bomber strikes (AF), other, carrier based air strikes and offshore artillery bombardment from naval guns ("calling in the Hand of God to level an entire 1km grid square") etc. all in conjunction with/support of primary ground forces operations (Army and Marines). 2) The second meaning (less often) referred to the introduction of nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons and tactics to conventional warfare (business as usual). The distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear warfare was two-fold. Primarily Strategic NW referred to the delivery methods and targets - long range (ICBMs, shorter range submarine launched missiles and long range bombers) delivery systems targeting locations military and otherwise, outside of the actual theater of operations but of strategic value: nations' capitals, major manufacturing centers of material used by the military, R&D facilities, etc. while Tactical NW referred to shorter range delivery methods (artillery, rocketry, even possibly mortars! as well as short range air strike capabilities) limited to military targets within the theater of war proper (including rear-echelon assets and civilian operated support facilities). The second distinction referred to weapon yield as deemed appropriate to the first distinction: Tactical warheads were less than 1 megaton in yield, while Strategic warheads exceeded that total yield (MIRV warheads singly might measure in hundreds of kilotons, but the whole cluster carried by a single ICBM would exceed 1 megaton). This also meant that if an apparently tactical strike (in terms of target and delivery system) were measured to exceed 1 megaton in yield, it would be classified as a strategic strike - doctrine then referred the conduct of the war back to Strategic Command (the Pentagon) because the very nature of the conflict would be viewed to have changed - our government would interpret that is the initiation of Strategic NW, regardless of target and delivery, and hold itself justified in responding in kind if it so chose. . . For the record, and the sake of historical comparison, the strikes upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, while comparatively low (tactical) yield by modern standards, are clearly classified as Strategic strikes by the doctrine I have just outlined. (To any readers who are disturbed by any of this, I recommend folding paper cranes which may be shipped to the address on this page (http://www.city.hiroshima.jp/shimin/heiwa/crane.html). Seriously. I still have nightmare every few years when my subconscious decides to remind me of some of the details of my training.)
Okay, now most of that would seem to be describing a great deal of what you would not include to any significant degree, it does have some relevance to bear in mind. The concept in the Strategic Doctrine and Foreign Policy of detente that I referred to in a previous post of Mutually Assured Annihilation was an outgrowth of the Nuclear Arms Race. Simply put, it soon became clear that if either nation launched a Strategic Nuclear Attack on the other, that other would be capable of detecting it and counter-attacking before the actual detonation and/or having sufficient surviving nuclear capabilities to launch a second round, ultimately leveling the majority of the northern hemisphere (and triggering Nuclear Winter, massive radioactive contamination of the rest of the globe, etc.). While you have not specified the actual means of Dominion scorched earth strategies it becomes clear that early on (possibly before nuclear proliferation reached the "critical mass" I've described) the Dominion called the bluff in 7 instances without suffering retaliation. Further however, the Paris Agreement seems to have changed that, with all nations in agreement upon retaliatory measures should the Dominion ever do so an 8th time. So you end up with a situation of detente as well. Outlining the relative strength and posture of the most significant non-Dominion players will help clarify how that plays out - and how to then move past or around it in terms of developing future doctrine in the course of the next (fictional) century.
For the rest of your doctrinal questions I so far have not been able to locate as yet a good resource. While this is essentially regarding conventional warfare, it is still a very complicated and involved subject - a good overview will be extremely lengthy, and little is published. You *could* go straight to the horse mouth so to speak, I've no doubt that declassified doctrinal manuals are available through gov't. printing offices, however these make a point of making access to them as impossibly labyrinthine as they can - you have to submit your request for a specific title (misspelling it will result in the answer that it doesn't exist,) to the specific repository handling the desired document (any other will likewise tell you they have no such document). No means of determining which repository that is will be provided, nor any means of browsing titles to determine which you think would be of use. In short, if you don't already have access to the document, you won't find any means of getting access to it. . . Nevertheless, it *is* available to the public and all you have to do is ask for a copy. . . Some common military Field Manuals can be found through Army/Navy Surplus businesses - both locally and on line - these will be outlining small element (squad, platoon, possibly company) level tactics used by a variety of unit types and can be very illuminating, particularly if you keep in mind that they are derived form, and comply with, broader tactical doctrine. Grasping how it's implemented can tell you a lot about the underlying principals. Surprisingly, one of the best overviews of larger unit organization and operations, US/NATO and Soviet/WP, can be found in the appendices of the manual to the old M1 Tank Platoon game by Microprose! The information was really irrelevant to the Sim (although it was a good one), they simply did a lot of good research (and hired knowledgeable military advisers) and decided to include it as a matter of interest. I spent quite a while this evening searching for a copy of it online (abandonware manuals can often be found) but sadly struck out. The best I can point you to for that is a used copy of the game (including manual) on amazon (http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/B000FFSG6A/ref=dp_olp_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1227154224&sr=8-2). This does however lead me to suggest looking through old wargaming materials (Shoot, Move and Communicate back issues etc., as well as games for the appropriate period) at your FNGS. They had to, like you're trying to do now, pare it all down into a clear, concise and digestible form. (For which reason I think it highly unlikely that I'll every end up writing for any of them. . .) Also, hit your local library's military history section for various issues of Jane's and Time-Life Books sets on the topic. Far and away the best thing you can do is pick the brains of any former or retired military personnel you may know - senior NCOs or commissioned officers. My previous deprecation of Lieutenants doesn't apply here - they come out of training steeped to the eyeballs and bleeding doctrine (and if they were academy cadets they will probably remain stigmatics for the rest of their unnatural lives. . .) What they have to learn on the job is how to actually apply that doctrine in the tasks-at-hand and day-to-day operations. (Watching them struggle to do so can be quite amusing.) For this discussion I'm relying on memory and there are large portions of the subject which are outside of my knowledge/experience base. I'll be happy to field any questions that I can, particularly if you encounter passages, concepts, etc. in your research materials which are unclear to you. Realize that you *don't need* a whole lot of detailed knowledge of the subject to create sufficient verisimilitude in your setting. You really only need to avoid glaring improbabilities in your initial material and then maintain internal consistency/continuity as you develop your alternate timeline into future projections. I don't know what system you're using, GURPs has done some stuff along these lines in its High-Tech and Firearms supplements, but most broad military stuff is WWII. Twilight 2000 probably reflects recent doctrine most closely. Used copies, along with 3rd ed. GURPs sourcebooks can probably be found cheaply in the bins of your FNGS.
Re: Cold War doctrinal tunnel vision and Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc.
Cold War conventional doctrine focused on large-scale, multi-divisional land battles waged along battle lines stretching the length of Europe. Note that this applied in Korea, but without the later technological advances, with some degree of success. Raw Chinese manpower prevented a decisive victory in over-running N. Korea, but N. Korea was successfully repelled - the primary objective was accomplished. This was the last conflict we engaged in on anything close to the scale of the projected "Big One" which operational doctrine was meant to address. Integrated armor/mechanized infantry divisions and the like simply had no place in Vietnam or Afghanistan - in both cases neither superpower was able to accomplish anything of note. Neither the US nor the USSR had formulated any operational doctrine suited to the conditions of these conflicts - enemy combatants remained disbursed, highly mobile and difficult to locate. They simply lacked the basic military courtesy to line up nicely across from their opponents and exchange ridiculous volumes of fire like civilized armies are supposed to. Note that the US is really faring little better in Afghanistan now than the USSR did in the '80s. We simply aren't losing large amounts of armor assets to guerrilla tactics since we aren't repeating the error of committing them to a theater in which they're useless. (Tanks in the open are a hell of a lot easier to target and kill than half a dozen camouflaged locals hiding behind a ridge line, firing off a few anti-tank weapons and then running like hell down the far side of said ridge to disappear once more into the local scenery.)
As to other points, ND pretty much covered them.
Thank you for your time. Right now I'll be working to re vise not only this but also the separate timeline for my campaign setting. Right now, I do think you're right in saying that I don't need specific information yet as just the overview of the entire situation would suffice. I'm think those specific resources you've mentioned would be more useful as background information on specific scenarios and modules.
So far now, I'm just going to act on what you generally know already. I'll post up the revision in a few days if I could work on it fast enough. It seems a ton of crap just rose from my point and it threatens to engulf me in pointless extracurricular activities.
Also, I'm not American. I'm Filipino. So what I know has been pretty much updated thanks to you.
Glad I could help. Are you currently living in the Philippines? If so, where? (The father of a close friend lives outside Manilla. . .)
Iloilo. It's a very happy if not backwater place.