VTU

[Snargash Moonclaw]

I'm you're unlikely to find anything of substance on the topic in magazine articles, and what you would find will really only offer a glimpse of foreign policy at a specific point in time, so the search through 30-40 years of archives is likely to be a huge amount of work for a minuscule payoff. I used to have a copy of this book. While focusing primarily on the technology of Strategic Nuclear War, as I recall it also provided a lot of info regarding Tactical Nuclear War and the "integrated battlefield." This last term was commonly used in two ways; 1) in reference to a combined overall doctrine incorporating the different branches of the military - Army, Navy and Air Force ceased to have separate doctrines since primary command in a given field of operation would be coordinating assets of all 3 - e.g., stealth bomber strikes (AF), other, carrier based air strikes and offshore artillery bombardment from naval guns ("calling in the Hand of God to level an entire 1km grid square") etc. all in conjunction with/support of primary ground forces operations (Army and Marines). 2) The second meaning (less often) referred to the introduction of nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons and tactics to conventional warfare (business as usual). The distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear warfare was two-fold. Primarily Strategic NW referred to the delivery methods and targets - long range (ICBMs, shorter range submarine launched missiles and long range bombers) delivery systems targeting locations military and otherwise, outside of the actual theater of operations but of strategic value: nations' capitals, major manufacturing centers of material used by the military, R&D facilities, etc. while Tactical NW referred to shorter range delivery methods (artillery, rocketry, even possibly mortars! as well as short range air strike capabilities) limited to military targets within the theater of war proper (including rear-echelon assets and civilian operated support facilities). The second distinction referred to weapon yield as deemed appropriate to the first distinction: Tactical warheads were less than 1 megaton in yield, while Strategic warheads exceeded that total yield (MIRV warheads singly might measure in hundreds of kilotons, but the whole cluster carried by a single ICBM would exceed 1 megaton). This also meant that if an apparently tactical strike (in terms of target and delivery system) were measured to exceed 1 megaton in yield, it would be classified as a strategic strike - doctrine then referred the conduct of the war back to Strategic Command (the Pentagon) because the very nature of the conflict would be viewed to have changed - our government would interpret that is the initiation of Strategic NW, regardless of target and delivery, and hold itself justified in responding in kind if it so chose. . . For the record, and the sake of historical comparison, the strikes upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, while comparatively low (tactical) yield by modern standards, are clearly classified as Strategic strikes by the doctrine I have just outlined. (To any readers who are disturbed by any of this, I recommend folding paper cranes which may be shipped to the address on  this page. Seriously. I still have nightmare every few years when my subconscious decides to remind me of some of the details of my training.)

Okay, now most of that would seem to be describing a great deal of what you would not include to any significant degree, it does have some relevance to bear in mind. The concept in the Strategic Doctrine and Foreign Policy of detente that I referred to in a previous post of Mutually Assured Annihilation was an outgrowth of the Nuclear Arms Race. Simply put, it soon became clear that if either nation launched a Strategic Nuclear Attack on the other, that other would be capable of detecting it and counter-attacking before the actual detonation and/or having sufficient surviving nuclear capabilities to launch a second round, ultimately leveling the majority of the northern hemisphere (and triggering Nuclear Winter, massive radioactive contamination of the rest of the globe, etc.). While you have not specified the actual means of Dominion scorched earth strategies it becomes clear that early on (possibly before nuclear proliferation reached the "critical mass" I've described) the Dominion called the bluff in 7 instances without suffering retaliation. Further however, the Paris Agreement seems to have changed that, with all nations in agreement upon retaliatory measures should the Dominion ever do so an 8th time. So you end up with a situation of detente as well. Outlining the relative strength and posture of the most significant non-Dominion players will help clarify how that plays out - and how to then move past or around it in terms of developing future doctrine in the course of the next (fictional) century.

For the rest of your doctrinal questions I so far have not been able to locate as yet a good resource. While this is essentially regarding conventional warfare, it is still a very complicated and involved subject - a good overview will be extremely lengthy, and little is published. You *could* go straight to the horse mouth so to speak, I've no doubt that declassified doctrinal manuals are available through gov't. printing offices, however these make a point of making access to them as impossibly labyrinthine as they can - you have to submit your request for a specific title (misspelling it will result in the answer that it doesn't exist,) to the specific repository handling the desired document (any other will likewise tell you they have no such document). No means of determining which repository that is will be provided, nor any means of browsing titles to determine which you think would be of use. In short, if you don't already have access to the document, you won't find any means of getting access to it. . . Nevertheless, it *is* available to the public and all you have to do is ask for a copy. . . Some common military Field Manuals can be found through Army/Navy Surplus businesses - both locally and on line - these will be outlining small element (squad, platoon, possibly company) level tactics used by a variety of unit types and can be very illuminating, particularly if you keep in mind that they are derived form, and comply with, broader tactical doctrine. Grasping how it's implemented can tell you a lot about the underlying principals. Surprisingly, one of the best overviews of larger unit organization and operations, US/NATO and Soviet/WP, can be found in the appendices of the manual to the old M1 Tank Platoon game by Microprose! The information was really irrelevant to the Sim (although it was a good one), they simply did a lot of good research (and hired knowledgeable military advisers) and decided to include it as a matter of interest. I spent quite a while this evening searching for a copy of it online (abandonware manuals can often be found) but sadly struck out. The best I can point you to for that is a used copy of the game (including manual) on amazon. This does however lead me to suggest looking through old wargaming materials (Shoot, Move and Communicate back issues etc., as well as games for the appropriate period) at your FNGS. They had to, like you're trying to do now, pare it all down into a clear, concise and digestible form. (For which reason I think it highly unlikely that I'll every end up writing for any of them. . .) Also, hit your local library's military history section for various issues of Jane's and Time-Life Books sets on the topic. Far and away the best thing you can do is pick the brains of any former or retired military personnel you may know - senior NCOs or commissioned officers. My previous deprecation of Lieutenants doesn't apply here - they come out of training steeped to the eyeballs and bleeding doctrine (and if they were academy cadets they will probably remain stigmatics for the rest of their unnatural lives. . .) What they have to learn on the job is how to actually apply that doctrine in the tasks-at-hand and day-to-day operations. (Watching them struggle to do so can be quite amusing.) For this discussion I'm relying on memory and there are large portions of the subject which are outside of my knowledge/experience base. I'll be happy to field any questions that I can, particularly if you encounter passages, concepts, etc. in your research materials which are unclear to you. Realize that you *don't need* a whole lot of detailed knowledge of the subject to create sufficient verisimilitude in your setting. You really only need to avoid glaring improbabilities in your initial material and then maintain internal consistency/continuity as you develop your alternate timeline into future projections. I don't know what system you're using, GURPs has done some stuff along these lines in its High-Tech and Firearms supplements, but most broad military stuff is WWII. Twilight 2000 probably reflects recent doctrine most closely. Used copies, along with 3rd ed. GURPs sourcebooks can probably be found cheaply in the bins of your FNGS.

Re: Cold War doctrinal tunnel vision and Vietnam, Afghanistan, etc.
Cold War conventional doctrine focused on large-scale, multi-divisional land battles waged along battle lines stretching the length of Europe. Note that this applied in Korea, but without the later technological advances, with some degree of success. Raw Chinese manpower prevented a decisive victory in over-running N. Korea, but N. Korea was successfully repelled - the primary objective was accomplished. This was the last conflict we engaged in on anything close to the scale of the projected "Big One" which operational doctrine was meant to address. Integrated armor/mechanized infantry divisions and the like simply had no place in Vietnam or Afghanistan - in both cases neither superpower was able to accomplish anything of note. Neither the US nor the USSR had formulated any operational doctrine suited to the conditions of these conflicts - enemy combatants remained disbursed, highly mobile and difficult to locate. They simply lacked the basic military courtesy to line up nicely across from their opponents and exchange ridiculous volumes of fire like civilized armies are supposed to. Note that the US is really faring little better in Afghanistan now than the USSR did in the '80s. We simply aren't losing large amounts of armor assets to guerrilla tactics since we aren't repeating the error of committing them to a theater in which they're useless. (Tanks in the open are a hell of a lot easier to target and kill than half a dozen camouflaged locals hiding behind a ridge line, firing off a few anti-tank weapons and then running like hell down the far side of said ridge to disappear once more into the local scenery.)

As to other points, ND pretty much covered them.

[Teh_Az]

Thank you for your time. Right now I'll be working to re vise not only this but also the separate timeline for my campaign setting. Right now, I do think you're right in saying that I don't need specific information yet as just the overview of the entire situation would suffice. I'm think those specific resources you've mentioned would be more useful as background information on specific scenarios and modules.

So far now, I'm just going to act on what you generally know already. I'll post up the revision in a few days if I could work on it fast enough. It seems a ton of crap just rose from my point and it threatens to engulf me in pointless extracurricular activities.

Also, I'm not American. I'm Filipino. So what I know has been pretty much updated thanks to you.

[Snargash Moonclaw]

Glad I could help. Are you currently living in the Philippines? If so, where? (The father of a close friend lives outside Manilla. . .)

[Teh_Az]

Iloilo. It's a very happy if not backwater place.