The Campaign Builder's Guild

Quote from: brainfacei've heard of that, but i can't trust anything that mixes crap with trippy science. it makes it really hard to tell the two apart. i guess i'll google search it.

do you have the titles to the books? i mean, if it's encoded into the universe that personal intent affects subatomic particles, i'll buy the book that explains how.

I can never remember where I read things.
In terms of the movie, you can go to special features and interviews and pretty easily sort out who's shitting you by what they say... The woman who claims to "channel" one of the inhabitants of "Lemuria"? Crap. The actually cited walkthroughs of semi-famous experiments, particle-wave duality, etc? Gold.

I do remember first learning the concept of particle-wave duality and the idea that an observed electron behaves differrently than an unobserved electron from a book called The Science of God (a title I wouldn't normally trust, but a very good read)... after that it was a trail of bibliographies through the rest of my Freshman year.

I've really lost interest in the science end of things, and have since moved to a more existencialist reading list. Kierkegaard, Jung, Sartre, etc. That and the usual ancient myths and religion obsession.

I haven't thought this hard since I lost my Sesame Street puzzle book!  

I will concede that the application of a dichotomy of that which is caused and that which is not is, like most dichotomies, ultimately erroneous, and that using such a term is perhaps not the wisest of choices.  But I will not concede that there are such things that transcend the presence or absence of precedent.  That is, though consciousness might not be bound within a causal or acausal system, it does not inhabit a universe wherein things that are neither causal nor acausal exist.  It may encompass them both, but it is not beyond them.

However, like you, for me it is not a question of the existence of precedent, but the nature of the precedent.  So what, then, is the precedent?  To quote your own words: "consciousness is its own precedent, encompasses all possibilities within itself, and can therefore decide which of all possibilities it allows to happen."  To suggest that consciousness is its own precedent, and not mention anything but consciousness as its own precedent, suggests a veritable mobius strip - an eternal return of the mind: "Awareness birthed itself, and will compel and sire itself forevermore."

Such a suggestion is, I think we can all agree, preposterous.  The notion has implications not only for the origin of our own consciousness, but for reality as an absolute.  It implies that, assuming a finite reality with a definite genesis, consciousness predates that reality, or that, in a universe without beginning, the mind is as old as the universe itself.  From a biological standpoint, this seems terribly unlikely (though admittedly possible).  There was a point at which we were unaware, and at some subsequent point in time, we attained a measure of awareness.  Whether or not a causal dichotomy applies (and again, I will concede that in such a context it may not), the fact is that at some point consciousness was "born", and at the instant of its birth it was incapable of self-reference and self-determination, as it was only in successive instants that it had a "self" to refer to.  In that first instant, when consciousness was sired, the causes which sired it and the reality that encompassed it defined the parameters in which it could operate and compel itself to operate subsequently.

For was there not a point at which the orbouros' tail was free of its own maw?  Only when it contrived to bite itself did it evolve from an object of linearity to a symbol of cyclical eternity.  It is like the idea of perpetual motion: in order for an engine to operate under such principles, it must first be activated.  Only then may it compel itself to remain in motion.  In such a way did the creation of consciousness define the boundaries within which said consciousness might otherwise "freely" orchestrate its own actions.

And once the mind achieved self-dependence, its liberation from the base machinations of an instinctive mind served only to constrain it within the parameters of its own desires, which in turn were constrained by the parameters designed by the events that inspired their genesis and, inescapably, the laws of the universe that contextualised such events.

So the mind, which compels itself in the present, was itself compelled in the past.  Thus, though consciousness defines the ultimate emergent possibility through perception, as you suggest, it was ultimately itself the result of an emergent possibility, and its every act is beholden not only to said emergence, but all manifest possibilities it has encountered or defined in past, and ever will subsequently.

It is therefore bound not only by the laws of its environment (indeterminate though they may be), but by its own internal laws, which are presumed in their intricacy to be the phenomena of a â,¬Å"free willedâ,¬Â entity, but are simply (in my opinion) so complex, convoluted and self-impelling (The Eternal Golden Braid springs instantly to mind, and with your evident intellect I am certain you will have understood it far better than I if you have read it) that we cannot ascertain the nature of their constituents.

â,¬Å"â,¬Â¦and [consciousness] can therefore decide which of all possibilities it allows to happen.â,¬Â

I won't deny that this is so (nor will I affirm it), but the fact that consciousness can make such decisions does not mean that such a decision is an act of liberty.  Thus, the debate comes full circle, and I pose the query once more: What drives the decision?  What impetus propagates the emergent possibility?

(Like you, it appears that the right explanation escapes me, and presuming your argument is not quite as you intended, Iâ,¬,,¢d like to know your intended point when you do find the words)

I am thus far not swayed, but I will add that while I remain convinced of my own correctness, your arguments are so persuasive that more than a quiver of uncertainty begins to rear its ugly (but not unwelcome) head.  I will concede without reluctance that you may very well be right, and if so, I will without hesitation convert, as it were.  But for now, I remain supplicate to an ideological reality free of liberty...

Any thoughts?

[spoiler=Help!!!]Seriously, if you have sufficient evidence to change my mind, Iâ,¬,,¢d love to hear it.  Only an idiot or a coward would prefer the absence of free will when the phenomenon does in fact exist, and Iâ,¬,,¢d like to think that I fill neither of those categories.[/spoiler]

The sucky thing is, now that I've started this debate, I might have to finish it.

Unless you absolutely pwn me (that is such an awkward word) and finish it yourself, which is a perfectly viable option and probably pretty likely.  I'd personally like to do the pwning, but hey, commoners can't be choosers. They ain't got the Will for it.

Many people misunderstand infinity.
A one inch line is measured in the finite distance of an inch.
But there is still an infinite number of points on that line.

Likewise, consciousness is not chronologically infinite, nor (always) chronologically the precedent for the outside world, but is the existencial precedent of all things, itself included. A rock is not a rock without someone to call it a rock. In fact, coming back to the whole collapsible wave function bit, this might even be true in the literal sense.

Coming back around to free will, though... we really need to decide what it's free of before we decide whether it is free of it, am I right? I would define it as being free of external casualty.

Sartre gives an excellent example of why it is you who choose in any given situation. A mother's only son, in a time of war, must choose to fight for his country or live and take care of his mother. Technically, he could ask for help in this decision. He could ask for help from his teacher (who will suggest war) or from his priest (who will suggest the opposite). But this person already knows what the two of them will say. Who he decides to ask is determined by himself. He already knows which rationalizations are more important to him. Logic and external casualty only appear to apply in a very superficial sense... Which logic or casualty he embraces is still his decision.

As for the idea that the consciousness is pre-birthed by reality... I see consciousness as self-awareness. Anything acted on before that point is not consciousness, therefore consciousness is still never acted on.

Argh!  Darn you Goedel!

And in that we agree wholeheartedly.  Consciousness preceeds all things for it defines all things - in a sense it is the uncaused first cause.

But my question remains: how does he decide.  What within himself causes him to decide upon whatever logic or causality he deems appropriate?  If the mind is the final arbiter of all things, what is the force of consciousness within consciousness that defines its own arbitration?

Saying that consciousness is free of external causality and defining that as free will is an issue of semantics.  It is inarguable that relative to said causality, it is indeed free, but that does not make it fundamentally so.  Within consciousness, the nature of the very same constrains it to act; not always as expected (rarely so, in fact), but always in whatever spectrum manifest inevitable by virtue of the bounds of its operation.

The question, again, is what are these bounds of operation?  How does one, in the presence of choice, come to choose?  You have eliminated external influence as the final arbiter of action, so what in our own minds causes us to act as we do?

In defining its relationship to itself, not in defining its relationship to the external, may we decide if it is free, and that is a realm heretofore relatively unexplored.  But we may at least state comfortably that yes, the mind is a force preceded and defined by itself.

In that, it is free.

(I always hate when an argument becomes an issue of relativity, which just about every intelligent philosophical debate I've ever had eventually became.  "Within this paradigm it is free; within this paradigm, maybe not".  I suppose that's simply testament to the inevitability of subjectivity.  Goedel warned by about this!!!)

I don't think I'll be continuing this debate, because if I do I'll start to wane enthusiasm.  Much better I quit now, while my appreciation for the exchange remains.  Thank ye, Sir Beejazz, for thine wizened repartee.  It hath been stimulating and illuminating and, though in some regards we are opposed, I acquiesce to the plausibility of thine contention.

And all things considered, I'd rather like to think you are right.

Good show.

0_o...

Wait... But that makes no sense. Beejazz doesn't make valid points. Argh!

So, in the light of the loss of interest in will...

The Bible: Massive Existencial Allegory?

Let's see if I can say something about free will. At this point I have no idea what I'm going to write next, so please forgive any chaotic arguments that don't seem to lead anywhere. If I don't hit anything interesting, I won't post this at all.

As always in a philosophical debate, we first need to decide on a definition of terms. If we don't, we will have a long argument only to eventually conclude, as Salacious Angel mentioned, that it depends on where you start reasoning (paradigm, as he called it, but I'll avoid compicated terminology here where I can because English is not my mother tongue).

What is free will? Is it really the absence of external causality in making decisions? If this is so (I think I'll want to give a different definition later) then free will certainly doesn't exist. Continuing along the line of arguments made earlier, consciousness is created by (at least chronologically) but more importantly exists within the context of external reality. (We do agree that there exists a reality beyond our own perception of it, do we? That would be a whole other debate.) This means that the actions we can take (and thus the decisions we can make) are ultimately limited by what reality allows us to do. For example, reality determines that sound only stretches so far, and thus I can not (make the decision to) talk to you directly now, but need to use this indirect menthod of communication via a forum. Similarly, physical truths determine that I can not (make the decision to) walk upwards into the sky: gravity binds me to this earth. Of course, technology can help me with these things, but some things will always remain impossible, I think you'll agree (take being in multiple places at once, for example).

If we agree on the above, we agree on the following: if free will is the ability to make decisions unhindered by external causality, then free will does not exist. Now, to me, the examples I gave to prove this statement are not a proof that there is no free will. I didn't state that making a decision (freely?) is impossible, I simply showed that not all decisions can be taken, which under our current definition would mean free will does not exist. I conclude: our current definition does not work; it does not describe free will accurately.

As I suggested in the last paragraph, what I'd really like to see from my definition of free will is that it enlightens us of whether or not there is such a thing as "making a decision". Let me try to give a new definition:

free will is the ability of our consciousness to make a decision, that is: to affect its own thoughts or actions in a "decisive" way, that is: the consciousness makes something happen inside or outside of the body that was not already definitively determined to happen (by external causality?).

I'm not sure about that last condition in parentheses, but overall I think this is a better definition of free will than the one that was given earlier. Reading back on my definition, the last part ("not definitively determined") catches my eye. Summarizing (that is, roughly speaking), I think I have defined free will as the absence of determinism. I can't say I'm entirely happy with this: free will has again become the absence of something else, rather than being something in its own right, while the latter seems more intuitive.

All of this seems to hinge on the question of positive vs. negative freedom. This is an issue that was raised by David Hume IIRC. In short, positive freedom is about being "free to", that is having the freedom to do something, while negative freedom is about being "free of", that is not being hindered by something. We seem to have focused on a negative definition of freedom here, and hence a negative definition of free will. If anyone can come up with a positive definition, I'd like to see it.

I'd like to see some feedback to all the things I've said above, perhaps some support for my definition or some other possible definitions of free will, before we will explore what this (or another) new definition means for our discussion topic ("does free will exist?"). So let's discuss this definition before we draw conclusions from it.

I'm also stopping here to prevent this post from crossing the line of being huge in size (now it's just big I hope). ;)

Túrin

"Free to..."
"Free to decide the effect of many possible causes, both internal and external?"
As I said before, it isn't that the outside universe is without effect... it is that the "inside" universe is the final arbiter...
And, IMHO, it's hard to define what anything is without in the same stroke defining what it isn't.

Oh, and being in multiple places simultaneously is more than just likely... it's probably true. Or would be if you weren't collapsing your wave function. Quantum physics is hilarious.

My definition of free will:

1. I am able to perceive the world, understand it, and make choices or decisions based on those perceptions and my own nature, goals, beliefs, and values.

2. These decisions are mine in the sense that they are not compelled upon me by anything except my own nature, goals, beliefs, and values.

3. I am able to put these decisions into action (successfully or not).

If all of these things are true, then I hold that I have free will in the only ways that matter. This is true whether my nature, goals, beliefs, etc. are deterministic, non-deterministic, partially deterministic, or whatever. Also irrespective of whether my "true self" is material, non-material, or some combination.

I also hold that these conditions are manifestly true, and therefore it is obvious that I have free will in all the ways that matter.

Quote from: beejazzThere is free will. Electrons exist in all possible positions until they (or their effects) are observed, at which time they collapse into a single position. Random number generator experiments show that the single position of the observed electron *is* affected by intent. This has certain implications in the brain's neural electrical impulses... namely that we control them and not the other way around.

in other words, personal intent controls subatomic particles, and in doing so, may even possibly affect atoms, molecules, or even more?

if thats what is implied by that statement, then i dont see how its a new idea, whatsoever; near as i can tell, its the basis of any religomagickal belief system. if im not mistaken, that was the basis of Aleister Crowley's law of Thelema, "Do as thou will shall be the whole of the law".

i still don't buy that. that requires some sort of interaction between the particle and the person's brain. otherwise the information can't be transferred. and coherent interaction, so somehow the particle not only responds to intent but responds correctly.
Like, if that shit's true, we're living in simulation space and there's a bug in the system.

Meh... a person has more "control" the more the outcome of something relies on electrical impulses... mostly impulses with observable outcomes, at that. Mostly, this would have to do with in-brain activity and such. It might have further application, but this would be highly limited and maybe take years and years of training. Internal monitoring and control is something most people practice in daily life.

I just wanted to get the "scientific" preconceptions about the "mechanistic" universe out of the way quickly. With or without free will, such preconceptions are detrimental to meaningful thought... or at least the idea that there is any meaning. Or that you (if there can be said to be a "you") have play any meaningful role on a larger scale.

Quote from: brainfacei still don't buy that. that requires some sort of interaction between the particle and the person's brain. otherwise the information can't be transferred. and coherent interaction, so somehow the particle not only responds to intent but responds correctly.
Like, if that shit's true, we're living in simulation space and there's a bug in the system.

The idea of force acting on our universe from the outside is actually pretty staple the further into it you get. Gravity, for example, acts on our universe from another... "leaking" so to speak... which is why it's so much weaker than magnetism.

But before we accept the whole gravity thing as writ, isn't string/superstring theory (as I presume you are basing this on) largely theoretical and unverified?  Not that I discount its merit (and I am actually a proponent), but, given its apparent unfalsifiability, is it viable enough that we can use gravity as an example of extracosmic phenomena?

But back on the subject of free will, I agree, by and large, with Snakefing's qualifications for free will.  Ultimately, it is only to the detriment of our own existence (or "meaningful thought", as Beejazz astutely put it) to assume the absence of free will.  It is the very same notion that motivates criminal's to defend their actions based on genetic predisposition: man is then no longer accountable for his actions.

Such is also the danger of utilitarianism.  Pure analysis and logical process merely destroy identity.  I like to think that through our possession of consciousness we ascend to become more than the sum of our parts, but for the absolutely calculative mind, this cannot be so.

Thus, only in presupposing free will may we make true progress, ethically or morally; to deny it is to defy the ultimate qualification of our humanity, and to render ourselves little more than the mindless matter that suffuses us.

This week's question:

"What is love?"

[spoiler=Bad song from that SNL sketch]Baby don't hurt me, don't hurt me, no more.[/spoiler]